We propose a quantum cryptography without public announcement. In the scheme, once a sender and a receiver share a secure seed random sequence, it can be used to send much more new random sequences. Using the seed sequence repeatedly is proven to be safe by quantum mechanical laws.
introduction
One of the most intriguing and exiting recent developments in quantum mechanics has been the prediction and demonstration of a cryptographic key distribution scheme, the security of which is guaranteed by the laws of quantum mechanics [1] . Theoretical models for quantum key distributions ( quantum cryptography ) has been based on the uncertainty principle [2] , EPR states [3, 13] , two nonorthogonal states [4] and Wheeler's delayed choice experiment [5] .
In all the proposed quantum cryptographies [1, 5] , there is a stage called public announcement at which Alice ( the sender ) and Bob ( the receiver ) exchanges some informations on their operations via classical channel. The eavesdropper, Eve, has full access to the announced information on the classical channel but she can listen only and cannot tamper with the signals.
By the way, the public announcement may cause some weakness in the quantum cryptographies: the public announcement might be used in defeating quantum cryptography, in the presence of noise, using still more sophisticated use of quantum physics [6, 7] . Even if this is not the case, the public announcement will help Eve to obtain more informations about Alice and Bob's data, for a given BER ( bit error rate ) [8] . Thus, it will be advantageous if we could implement a quantum cryptography without public announcement. In this note, we propose a quantum cryptography of BB84 type [2] without public announcement.
It is organized as follows. First we consider a simple form of quantum cryptography and it's weak point. We consider how it's weak point is overcome in BB84 scheme [2] . Then we propose another method different from that of BB84 to overcome the weak point of the simple quantum cryptography. We show that with this method we can implement a quantum cryptography without public announcement.
quantum cryptography without public announcement
We may consider the following simple quantum cryptography. Alice send to Bob some quantum carriers ( spin- This simple quantum cryptography has some weak points: there are some considerable probability that Eve measures along a direction almost similar to u, since here is only one hidden parameter u. And Eve can get information about u by trying various candidate for u.
Eve may try various candidate directions until eavesdropping is successful.
This weak point of the simple quantum cryptography are overcome in BB84 scheme in the following ways. Alice uses randomly one of two directions u and u ′ for encoding ( u and u ′ are chosen z and x in BB84, respectively ) Bob also performs spin-measurements along direction randomly chosen between u and u ′ . After all quantum carriers have arrived to Bob, Alice and Bob announce publically each other which direction they chose at each instance. In about half of all the instances, the direction Alice chose are the same as those Bob chose. In these instances, there will be 100% correlation between Alice and Bob, unless the quantum carriers were perturbed by Eve or noise. With this strategy of BB84 Alice and Bob can prevent Eve from knowing which direction Alice choose to encode. It is because even if Eve knows about u and u ′ , Eve knows nothing about which of u and u ′ is chosen by Alice at a particular instance, before the public announcement.
However, this strategy may cause some weakness due to the public announcement, as said in previous section. Thus, we consider the following another shielding strategy. First, Alice and Bob share by classical methods some 2-bit random sequence that is unknown to anyone else. This ( seed ) random sequence common to Alice and Bob is then used to determine the encoding direction u and u ′ . That is, Alice ( Bob ) encodes ( performs spin-measurement ) on the direction z and x when it is 0 and 1, respectively. For example, when the seed random 
, then Alice sends to Bob the following quantum carriers
Since Alice and Bob have common ( the seed ) random sequence, there will be 100% correlation between Alice and Bob in this strategy, too, unless the quantum carriers were perturbed by Eve or noise. Furthermore, the public announcement is not needed in this strategy. The problem is whether we can use the seed random sequence repeatedly. If this is not the case, this strategy fails because Alice and Bob have to consume the same length of random sequences to obtain some length of new random sequences. Interestingly, quantum mechanical laws enable the seed random sequences to be used repeatedly enough, as shown below.
Suppose Alice used the seed random sequence of Eq. |x− x − | ). Thus, these two sequences of states cannot be distinguished by any quantum mechanical methods including the generalized measurements [9, 10] ( about this indistinguishability we will discuss more in later section ). Thus, Eve cannot distinguish which direction is used, and the seed sequence can be used repeatedly.
We confirm that above scheme is no weaker than BB84 to various eavesdropping strategies, as long as the seed sequence is unknown to Eve, even after the seed sequence is used repeatedly.
discussion and conclusion
The above scheme has a supplementary advantage: there is no data discarded in the ideal case.
In BB84, about half of data are discarded. It is because the probability that Alice and Bob choose coincidently the same direction between z and x is 1 2 , and the case when Alice and Bob choose different directions each other are discarded.
Alice and Bob should avoid using the same seed sequence too many times, even though Eve can extract no information on the seed sequence by any quantum mechanical operations as shown in previous section. It is because Eve can use trial and error method: Eve try various candidates for the seed sequence at each time until eavesdropping is successful, if Alice and Bob use one seed sequence too many times enough for Eve to search almost of the space of 2-bit array in which the seed sequence is embedded. If Eve find correct seed sequence after long time endeavor, she can successfully eavesdrop without being detected. This can be avoided, however, by using one seed sequence not so many times, say 10 times, and replacing the seed sequence by the 10-th random sequence sent by the seed sequence. In this way, if once Alice and Bob have secure common random sequence that will be used as the seed sequence, they need no more random sequence securely shared between them by other methods.
In the above scheme, Alice and Bob should compare some randomly chosen subset of Alice and Bob's data in order to check if there were errors, as in BB84 scheme: Bob inform publically to Alice whether he obtained + or − at the subset of instances. ( here we use some public announcement. However, it is only for some small subset of instances that will be discarded.
Thus, this cannot be used for eavesdropping.) Alice compares the informed data with her ones and check if there is error. We confirm that even in the case of the randomly chosen subset, the seed sequence is not known to Eve. It is because what Eve knows for the subset are the measurement results of Bob, and Eve can get no informations on the seed sequence by any quantum mechanical processes including Bob's one.
The above scheme can be obviously applied to the scheme using EPR states [3] [13] [7] [8].
and above scheme might be used in proving the security of quantum cryptography, because there is no public announcement in it. Now, we show the indistinguishability between |x− x − | by another physical argument: if they are distinguishable we can implement the superluminal communications using the spin-version [11, 12] of Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) [13, 12] experiment. Let the state of source particle pairs is the singlet one |x− x − | ). Thus if the one at site 2 can distinguish between them, the one at site 1 can send signal instantaneously to the one at site 2, by performing spin-measurement along z or x direction according to the 2-bit sequence he wants to send.
In summary, we have proposed a quantum cryptography without public announcement. In the scheme, once a sender and a receiver share a secure seed random sequence, it can be used to send much more new random sequences without public announcement. Using the seed sequence repeatedly is proven to be safe by quantum mechanical laws.
